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Abstract 
This paper provides an explanation of the skeptical puzzle. I argue that we can take two distinct points of view 
towards representations, mental representations like perceptual experiences and artificial representations like 
symbols. When focusing on what the representation represents we take an attached point of view. When focusing 
on the representational character of the representation we take a detached point view. From an attached point of 
view, we have the intuition that we can know that p simply by using the representation and without having prior 
knowledge about the reliability of the source that delivers the representation. When taking a detached point of 
view, we tend to think that we must have this kind of prior knowledge. These two conflicting intuitions about 
knowledge and representations provide the basis for our intuition of immediate perceptual knowledge on the one 
hand and for the skeptical intuition of underdetermination on the other hand.  
 
 
1. The Immediate-Knowledge Intuition and the Intuition of Underdetermination  
The skeptical problem is usually regarded as a puzzle about conflicting intuitions. First, we are convinced that we 
have perceptual knowledge about the external world, second, the intuition is persisting that we do not know that 
the skeptical hypotheses are false, and, third, we think that if we know the first then we know the second. Each of 
these three intuitions seems plausible, but together they are inconsistent. The skeptical and the anti-skeptical 
intuition that I will focus on here are the intuition of immediate perceptual knowledge about the external world on 
the one hand, and the underdetermination view that all our evidence equally supports the real-world-hypothesis 
and the skeptical hypothesis on the other hand.  
According to our natural and pre-philosophical understanding of knowledge external world knowledge via 
perception is simple and immediate. Intuitively, we attribute knowledge about the surrounding to infants before 
they acquire concepts of reliability, trustworthiness or of skeptical hypotheses and we attribute additional 
knowledge to them when they acquire these concepts. This is the immediate-knowledge-intuition. This intuition is 
compatible with numerous knowledge accounts, such as process reliabilism, dogmatism as put forward by Pryor 
(2000 and 2004) or Sosa’s (2007) concept of animal knowledge.  
The intuition of underdetermination is one of the most persisting anti-skeptical intuition. It states that our evidence 
does not favor the real-world-hypothesis that the world is broadly the way we believe it to be to a skeptical 
hypothesis that we are systematically deceived in falsely believing. We can formulate this intuition as follows.  
 
The intuition of underdetermination  
Our evidence does not favor the real-world-hypothesis over the skeptical hypotheses. 
 
The skeptical argument based on this intuition is often called the argument of underdetermination, which is the 
argument that we do not have any perceptual knowledge because our evidence underdetermines the real-world-
hypothesis given that it does not favor it over some skeptical hypothesis. 
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Let me reflect on the skeptical intuition of underdetermination in more detail. For example, S’s experience as of a 
computer in front of her underdetermines the hypothesis that there actually is a computer in front of her because it 
does not favor this hypothesis over the skeptical hypothesis that S is a BIV deceived in falsely believing that there 
is a computer in front of her. S experiences as of p but there are two competing hypotheses about the origin of S’s 
experience, the real-world-hypothesis and a skeptical hypothesis. S’s knowledge about her experiences and beliefs 
does not favor the real-world-hypothesis over the skeptical hypothesis. Hence, S’s belief in the real-world-
hypothesis is evidentially underdetermined.  
It is important to note that the intuition of underdetermination is not only characterized by what we do not know 
and why we do not know, but also by what we do know. S does know that she experiences as of p. Thus, it is 
assumed that S has knowledge about her own current mental states, most plausibly via introspection. S just does 
not know what caused her experiences. 
 
2 Liberalism and Conservatism   
Pryor (2004) introduced the terminology of liberalism and conservatism for referring to two rival accounts on 
perceptual justification. According to Pryor (2004, 355) liberals and conservatives diverge about the role of non-
perceiving hypotheses which are “(known to be) incompatible with one’s experiences being genuine perceptions” 
like the hypothesis that I am hallucinating right now. Conservatives about perception like Wright (2002 and 2004) 
defend the following claim. 
 
Conservatism 
S is justified to believe that p based on her experiences as of p, only if S has prior justification to believe 
that any non-perceiving hypothesis is false. 
 
Liberalism is the denial of conservatism. Liberals like Pryor (2000, 520) hold that “not only can we have perceptual 
knowledge and justified perceptual belief, we might have it without being in a position to cite anything that could 
count as ampliative, non-question-begging evidence for those beliefs.” Liberals treat non-perceiving hypotheses 
only as underminers, i.e. evidence for non-perceiving hypotheses tends to undermine our perceptual justification. 
However, in the absence of any evidence for or against non-perceiving hypotheses, we have prima facie perceptual 
justification.  
Hence, the conflict between liberals and conservatives is one about the architecture of knowledge. Liberals accept 
that perceptual knowledge can be immediate and non-inferential. This view is accordance with our natural and 
non-philosophical understanding that perceptual knowledge is simple and immediate. Conservatives deny the 
immediacy of perceptual knowledge or at least have to explain why it is immediate despite not being fundamental. 
 
3 Knowledge and Representations  
In this section, I will argue that the conflicting intuitions of liberalism and conservatism rely on two distinct concept 
of knowledge via representations, first, knowing simply by using a representation (or by being confronted with a 
representation) and, second, knowing by reflecting on the representation and on its representational character from 
a more detached point of view. I understand representations as mental representations like experiences and beliefs 
or artificial representations like symbols, signals or texts. 
When confronted with representations we can, first, acquire knowledge about what the representation represents 
and, second, about the representation itself. We can acquire knowledge that p, when having an experience as of p, 
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when reading in a textbook that p or when being told that p. This is knowledge about what the representation 
represents based on the representation. Moreover, we can acquire knowledge about representations and their 
representational character, for example that I have an experience as of p, that the textbook says that p or that S 
asserts that p. There is no tension between the two kinds of knowledge, i.e. between knowledge via representations 
about the facts represented and knowledge about the representations themselves. The crucial point is that we can 
have conflicting intuitions about the relations between knowledge that p based on representations that p and 
knowledge about these representations. The first intuition is one about knowledge when using representations (or 
when being confronted with representations). The second is one about knowledge when reflecting about 
representations.   
 
(a) The intuition of knowledge from an attached point of view (IA) 
From an attached point of view, we think that we can come to know that p simply by being confronted with a 
representation that p, but without knowing much or even anything about the representation or its source. In this 
case, we simply use a representation for acquiring knowledge but without doing much prior reflection work on it. 
We can distinguish between a strong claim and a weak claim about knowledge from an attached point of view.  
 
IA-strong  
When S is confronted with a representation R that p, then S can know that p simply by forming a belief 
that p on the basis of R (i.e. without knowing that R is a representation that p and without knowing that 
R is delivered by a reliable source.) 
 
IA-weak  
When S is confronted with a representation R that p and when S knows that R is a representation that p, 
then S can know that p simply by forming a belief that p on the basis of R (i.e. without knowing that R is 
delivered by a reliable source.) 
 
IA-weak is weaker than IA-strong, because IA-strong allows knowledge via a representation R that p without even 
knowing that R is a representation that p. Process reliabilism defends IA-strong since it claims that a belief that p 
is justified, if the belief-forming process is reliable which is the case, if the representation is delivered by a reliable 
source, no matter whether S has knowledge about the representational nature of the representation involved. 
Furthermore, Sosa (2007) presumably defends this strong claim with respect to animal knowledge and Pryor (2000, 
520) plausibly accepts this view with respect to experiences and perceptual knowledge. Various intermediate 
versions of IA are possible, e.g. that S must implicitly believe that R is a representation or that S must be in a 
position to know that R is a representation. We assume that a version of IA is true if we make knowledge ascriptions 
of the following kind: The infant knows that there is a red ball in front of her because she sees a red ball in front 
of her. I know that the Giants won their last game because I read it in the NYT.  
 
(b) The intuition of knowledge from a detached point of view (ID) 
When focusing our attention on the representational character of the representation rather than on what the 
representation represents we take a detached point of view towards the representation. The resulting intuition about 
knowledge via the representation can be characterized as follows. When S is confronted with a representation that 
p, e.g. a travel report in a newspaper or the output of a measurement device such as a thermometer, then it is naïve 
to assume that S can know that p without knowing anything about the reliability of the newspaper or the 
measurement device. In order to know that p, S must have knowledge about the reliability of the representation 
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delivering source, for example by comparing the reports of the newspaper to reports of other newspapers, by 
acquiring background information about the newspaper, by comparing the output of the thermometer to the output 
of other thermometers or by acquiring background information about the company that produces the thermometer. 
For having knowledge that p when confronted with a representation that p, we must have this kind of prior 
knowledge about the reliability of the representation. If S does not have this prior knowledge, S only knows that 
the newspaper says that p or that the thermometer indicates that p, but S does not know that p itself. We can 
summarize this intuition from a detached point of view (ID) as follows.  
 
ID 
If S is confronted with a representation R that p, then S can know that p via R only if S knows that R is a 
representation that p and if S has prior knowledge that R is delivered by a reliable source. 
 
Note that ID not only state that S does not know that p when confronted with R, if S has knowledge or reasons to 
believe that R is not reliable. Rather ID is the stronger claim that without any prior evidence about the reliability 
of R, S does not know that p on the basis of R. This view captures the skeptical intuition of underdetermination. 
The two intuitions IA and ID contradict each other. IA states that S can know that p via R without having prior 
knowledge about the reliability of R. ID precisely denies this.  
How can we explain why these two conflicting intuitions arise? They are based on shifts of attention which support 
two different points of view that we can take towards representations. On the one hand, we can primarily use 
representations for acquiring knowledge about the world without doing much or even any reflection work about 
the representation. In this case, we focus our attention on what the representation represents and take an attached 
point of view towards the representation. On the other, we can take a detached point of view towards 
representations and focus our attention on the representational character of a representation R, i.e. on the fact that 
R is a representation that p.1 When taking a detached point of view, the representational character of R becomes 
salient to us. From that point of view, it seems plausible that we only know that R is a representation that p, unless 
we have prior evidence that R is delivered by a reliable source. The two conflicting intuitions IA and ID are 
motivated in the following way. 
 
When focusing our attention on what R represents, we take an attached point of view towards R that 
supports IA. 
When focusing our attention on the representational character of R, we take a detached point of view 
towards R that supports ID. 
 
It is important to note that I do not argue here that one of these intuitions is accurate and the other one not. They 
both seem legitimate. I only want to explain how they arise. Moreover, I do not claim that when confronted with 
a representation R, we take and maintain either an attached or a detached point of view. Rather we can switch 
between the points of view by shifting our attention between what R represents and R’s representational character.  
Furthermore, I do not think that we can only take one point of view at one moment of time. Rather we can hold 
both points of view, but one is dominant and the other recessive, depending on what we focus on, and accordingly, 
one intuition is dominant and the other recessive.  
                                                          
1 Bilgrami (2006) uses the concept of a detached point of view in a similar way, but regarding values in the world.  
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According to the presented view, there is a cognitive difference between primarily using a representation that p 
for coming to believe that p and primarily believing that something is a representation that p. In this sense, 
representations are Janus faced. On the one hand, we can use them for forming beliefs; on the other hand, we can 
focus on their representational character. I think that this Janus-faced nature explains at least one type of skeptical 
intuitions, namely the intuition of underdetermination.  
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